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Abstract 
 
For the first time in nearly 30 years, 2013 has seen increasing public awareness of calls for a 
comprehensive boycott of and sanctions on a state based on questions of an “entrenched 
system of racial discrimination”. The call to boycott South African sport emerged in the 
1950s as the apartheid state was developing and refining its comprehensive and systematic 
legal form amid growing international pressure for decolonisation. This is a different social 
and political context than the call 50 years later by Palestinian civil society for boycott, 
divestment and sanctions against Israel (BDS). This paper draws on analyses of 
international anti-apartheid movements’ campaigns against sporting contact with South 
Africa and the BDS call for the isolation of the Israeli state to propose a theory of sports 
boycotts. It looks at the anti-apartheid campaigns, especially those in the early 1960s, to 
consider ways in which the BDS campaign has an impact on existing historical 
understandings of cultural boycotts as a tactical and strategic campaign tool. 
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************************************************************** 
Boycotts and related forms of political pressure have been a recurring element in the 
analyses of sport in international relations and international relations in sport. This paper 
does three things. First, revisit the anti-apartheid sports campaign to consider its form and 
character. This will inform a wider discussion of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions as 
political tactics and explore what it is about the characteristics of international sport that 
makes sports sanctions distinctive. Finally, a nascent theory of sports boycotts will be 
assessed through the campaign targeting the 2013 UEFA U-21 tournament to explore the 
extent to which we need to review or revise our analyses of bilateral sports boycotts in 
particular and cultural boycotts more generally. 
 
The focus in the sports boycotts literature on the Olympic boycotts of 1980 and 1984 
emphasising multi-lateral sports boycotts obscures key aspects of sport in international 
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relations, diverts attention away from the global distinctiveness of the IOC as a sports body 
and downplays the significance of differences between the organisation of Olympic Games 
and other forms of international sports events. The paradox of the Cold War focus on the 
1980 and 1984 Olympic boycotts is that the 1976 Montreal boycott was part of the only time 
an international sports boycott was successful in achieving its long term goals – the ending 
of South African apartheid. Although not the most significant factor in the collapse of 
apartheid, the sports boycott was responsible for a series of significant blows against the 
cultural security of apartheid’s dominant groups. Analysis of the anti-apartheid boycott 
movement has tailed off in recent years, in part because there is only so much we can say 
about sports boycotts, in part because South African history is developing new areas of 
analysis focussing on the country’s sporting past and physical culture, and in part because 
there have been other pressing issues to explore. 
 
The relevance and significance of sports boycotts changed in 2012/13 with the intensification 
of action in support of a 2011 call from within Palestinian civil society for teams to boycott the 
2013 UEFA Under-21 championships to be held in Israel. This campaign invoked as one of 
its predecessors the anti-apartheid campaign’s call between the mid-1950s and 1992 for the 
isolation of South Africa. Other calls for sports and wider boycotts in the previous twenty 
years had been limited or, as we have seen in the recent call for LGBT athletes to boycott 
the Sochi Olympics over Russia’s recent antigay legislation, centred on individual athletes 
rather than sport systems. Public discussion of boycotts and similar kinds of pressure on 
states has been dominated by state-sponsored comprehensive sanctions activity, such as 
those directed at Iraq and Iran, or the so-called smart or targeted sanctions directed at 
members of the political élites in places such as Zimbabwe and Syria. Unlike state-
sponsored action, this recent call for a cultural boycott of the Israeli state was a campaign 
grounded in the civil society networks of those peoples who are the subject of close and 
restrictive state control. There seem to be significant parallels with the South African case. 
The explicit invocation of the anti-apartheid campaign and its role as the most high profile of 
the bilateral boycotts campaigns means that the time is right to begin to revisit and review 
our analyses of sports boycotts. 
 
While many may feel uncomfortable with calls for a boycott of Israel and the application to 
Israel of the apartheid label1
 given the UN’s 1973 definition of apartheid as “inhuman acts for 
the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over 
any other racial group and systematically oppressing them”,2 we must also be wary of falling 
into the trap of equating apartheid with the South African situation only or reifying the South 
African system. Israel’s actions are contested in international law. The International Court of 
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Justice in 2004 issued an Advisory Opinion that the Separation Wall Israel is building across 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories is in violation of international law, while elsewhere it has 
been argued that Israel’s support for the West Bank settlement building programme is also in 
violation.3 Defenders of Israel point, in response, to alleged violations of international law by 
neighbouring states and assert Israel’s compliance with UN resolutions. The issue is not the 
legitimacy of either stance; the situation is hotly contested and advocates of the boycott can 
point to important critiques of the situation they are seeking to address. These questions of 
the validity of charges against Israel are secondary to the fact of the Boycott, Divestment 
and Sanctions (BDS) campaign and the focus of this paper: how we might make sense of bi- 
and multi-lateral sports, and by implication cultural, boycotts in the light of this 2013 
campaign. 
 
Boycotting (South African) Apartheid Sport 
 
The boycott campaign was one of the principal tools that the anti-apartheid movement had in 
its toolkit to dismantle the white South African government’s systematic racial classification 
and oppression. In discussions of anti-apartheid campaigns, it is common to identify 1959 as 
the year that the boycott movement came together into coordinated international activism. 
There had been boycott events before 1959; the All Africa People’s Conference in 1958 
called for a boycott of South African goods and during the mid-1950s the white governing 
body of table tennis had been expelled from the international federation. It was the formation 
of the Boycott Movement Committee drawing together representatives of anti-apartheid 
groups from South Africa and the UK in London in December 1959 that marked a significant 
new level of co-ordination in the campaign coinciding with an emerging activist campaign in 
New Zealand focussing on the 1960 rugby tour of South Africa under the slogan ‘No Maoris, 
No Tour’. This campaign laid the base for one of the most sustained elements of the sports 
boycott – the movement to stop rugby union and other sports contact between New Zealand 
and South Africa that lasted until the mid-1980s.4 
 
The situation of South African sport under apartheid was complex. Although it was possible 
to point to systematic racial discrimination in South Africa from the time of earliest 
colonisation and the emergence of social practices from around the time of World War One 
that embedded that discrimination in legal and quasi-legal practice, the situation changed 
with the election in 1948 of a government led by the conservative Reformed National Party, 
replacing the more liberal New Democratic Party. Liberal is a relative term here; Jan Smuts, 
the Party’s leader defeated in the 1948 election actively supported segregation, arguing in 
1929 that: 
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The old practice mixed up black with white in the same institutions, and 
nothing else was possible after the native institutions and traditions had been 
carelessly or deliberately destroyed. But in the new plan there will be what is 
called in South Africa "segregation"; two separate institutions for the two 
elements of the population living in their own separate areas. Separate 
institutions involve territorial segregation of the white and black. If they live 
mixed together it is not practicable to sort them out under separate institutions 
of their own. Institutional segregation carries with it territorial segregation.5 
 
Where Smuts’ government differed significantly from the incoming government was its 
support for the view that Black South Africans should be considered and treated as 
permanent residents of a white dominated South Africa, not as guest workers whose real 
home lay in the reserves. Although this difference anticipated the political distinctions to 
emerge with the formalisation of the Bantustan policy, the basic legal and therefore systemic 
elements of apartheid developed in the first few years of National Party rule; alongside key 
legislation including the Population Registration Act (1950) that required all residents to be 
registered as one of four racial groups, the various Pass Laws Acts (1952 and thereafter), 
the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950) and the Bantu 
Education Act (1953) the principal laws affecting sport were the Group Areas Act (1950) and 
the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953). 
 
These latter two pieces of legislation and the regulations and case law that flowed from 
them, along with several other Acts of Parliament including the Coloured Persons Communal 
Reserves Act (1961), divided the country into regions designated for occupation and use by 
the four identified ‘racial’ groups – White, Black, Indian and Coloured, where Coloured 
encapsulated most non-Indian Asians, people of mixed race descent and otherwise acted as 
a ‘miscellaneous’ category. This division overwhelmingly favoured the White group; 24% of 
the population who controlled 86% of the land, and the best land at that. Despite being 
popularly seen, externally, as a National Party programme, this legislation formalised the 
practice of territorial segregation Smuts had envisaged in 1929. By 1954 this separation then 
was both spatial – the Group Areas Act – and could be enforced in relation to individual 
structures, services and related facilities – the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act. 
 
The effect of these developments on sport was profound, preventing informal or ‘pick up’ 
games while allowing ‘inter-racial’ sport between members of organised teams and leagues 
where a permit had been issued. At times this legislation led to moments of absurdity if they 
were not so offensive, such as the awards ceremony at the 1963 Natal Open golf 
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championship, which was won by the Indian Sewsunker ‘Papwa’ Sewgolum. Sewgolum had 
been allowed to play, but the permit did not allow him access to the club house; the trophy 
was handed to him through a window and the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
suspended its news reporting of the tournament because its rules did not allow it to cover 
‘mixed’ sport. 
 
In the initial stages of the post-war era as organised international opposition began to 
emerge, the focus was on these exclusionary mechanisms that prevented ‘mixed sport’.6 
Visiting sports teams habitually excluded athletes of colour from their teams, hence the 
campaign in New Zealand in 1960 around the slogan ‘No Maoris, No Tour’ while it was the 
controversy over the selection of the former South African ‘Coloured’ Basil D’Olivera as a 
member of the MCC (English) cricket team to tour South Africa in 1968 that was one of the 
crucial factors in South Africa’s isolation from international cricket.7 The international 
campaign for a sports boycott operated on two principal fronts, one focussed on multi-lateral 
sports settings with an emphasis on the Olympic Games and the second centred on bilateral 
sports contacts. While the initial emphasis of the campaign, as seen for instance in New 
Zealand in 1960, was to oppose discriminatory sports practices, towards the latter half of the 
1960s this position shifted to one where anti-apartheid groups opposed the apartheid 
system, not just its effects on sport, invoking Hassan Howa’s (who became leader in the late 
1970s of the South African Council on Sport) statement that there could be “no normal sport 
in an abnormal society”.8 
 
Olympic boycotts 
The campaign aimed at Olympic participation scored early successes with the suspension of 
South Africa from the 1968 Mexico Games, although that has been overshadowed in 
Olympic memory by the Smith-Carlos salute and the Tlatelolco massacre that resulted in the 
deaths of 28 student protestors and wounding of several hundred of the their fellow activists 
in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the lead up to the Games. Without wishing to understate 
the effect of the Tlatelolco massacre on Mexican politics, or arguably the study of sports 
history in Mexico, the decision by the IOC, under pressure from a threatened boycott by 50 
nations as well as Black members of the USA team, to withdraw its invitation to South Africa 
had a profound effect on the boycott narrative. Although South Africa had not been invited to 
the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the IOC had side-lined demands to explore claims that the South 
African National Olympic Committee (SANOC) violated the Olympic Charter by practicing 
racial discrimination – an allegation made to the IOC by the South African Sports Association 
in 1960. Debates in Mexico City forced the IOC to act. The IOC’s fact-finding mission to 
South Africa in 1967 had been instructed to address only whether SANOC complied with 
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Olympic regulations, not to judge apartheid; this instruction to limit the focus came after 
repeated accommodation of and adaptation to the structure of apartheid sport alongside 
denunciation of but no action against government interference in sport. The South African 
Government insisted that SANOC comply with South Africa’s ‘customary’ separation of sport 
along racial lines. This requirement along with increasing membership of the IOC from Third 
World and Eastern bloc states that resulted in a shift in the IOC’s power balance meant that 
in 1970 the IOC voted to expel South Africa. The vote was close at 35 to 28 with three 
abstentions, and may have been that a provocative and inflammatory speech by SANOC 
leader Frank Braun as well as the use of Olympic symbols during the 1969 and 1970 ‘South 
African Games’, devised as compensation for the expulsion form the Mexico Games, caused 
some IOC members to vote for expulsion instead of a less harsh penalty.9 Thereafter, as 
seen in Montreal in 1976, the focus of anti-apartheid boycott activity at the Olympics was 
directed at third party links, those states such as New Zealand, that maintained high level 
sporting relations, although the focus on rugby union and cricket has constrained analyses of 
the sport-apartheid nexus.10 
 
While these changing geo-political conditions had a significant impact on the direction and 
effectiveness of the boycott campaign targeting South African sport in the 1960s, they must 
not be allowed to blind us to the other major factor in the process: the presence of a credible 
internal non-racial sports movement.11 Most sports had four officially sanctioned ‘national’ 
governing bodies, one for each ‘racial’ group – White, Black, Asian and Coloured. In many 
cases there was also a fifth non-racial governing body that, in being non-racial, rejected the 
confines and provisions of the apartheid structures. In addition, there were also 
representative campaigning bodies such as South African Sports Association and the South 
African Council on Sport. These non-racial sports bodies gave the international anti-
apartheid movement and the boycott campaign institutions and groups they could identify as 
legitimate anti-apartheid voices in sport politics. For many in the international solidarity 
campaign, the voice of non-racial sport was the South African Non-Racial Olympic 
Committee (SAN-ROC). An aspect of the debate, therefore, was over the credibility of 
various voices and the legitimacy both of apartheid and of the sovereign authority of South 
Africa to determine its own policies. While the international sports world debated these 
questions and while the South African government during the 1960s made adjustments to 
their sports policies and the rules governing visiting teams in particular, the geo-political shift 
associated with 1950s and 1960s decolonization and with the growing presence of Eastern 
bloc and Third World states in global cultural politics contributed to a shift in the political 
demands concerning apartheid sport. Whereas at the beginning of the 1960s debates 
around apartheid sport focussed on who was allowed to represent South Africa and limits 
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placed on membership of touring teams, by the latter half of the decade to focus was on the 
apartheid state itself.12 
 
This change in the political demands was more obviously seen in the single-sport campaigns 
that tended to be localised and focus on the participation by South African athletes in 
specific events or competitions but were often accompanied by successful campaigns to 
expel South African federations from international sports governing bodies. These 
campaigns saw South Africa expelled from or have its membership cancelled or suspended 
by a wide range of international sports bodies by the end of the 1970s, including men’s 
cricket, netball, football, basketball, amateur cycling and swimming. In two cases, table 
tennis and darts, the international governing body recognised a non-racial federation.13 
Much of this was the consequence of behind the scenes lobbying and pressure developed 
through national governing bodies, while a key factor in some cases was the pressure seen 
in the IOC’s debates from Third World states and those aligned to the Soviet Union and 
People’s Republic of China; early, if in some cases pragmatic, supporters of boycotts and 
sanctions. 
 
Bilateral contact 
The vital role that governments, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, played should not 
be under-estimated. This was not, however, a factor in the handful of sports that carried the 
greatest cultural weight in White South Africa, most especially cricket and rugby union – 
although it was rugby union that mattered most, being both a vital marker of national 
dynamism and power and essential to the integrity of Afrikaner masculinity as the epitome of 
national vigour.14 Given the global distribution of rugby union and its dominant teams, its 
cultural significance in South Africa meant the most important sporting contacts were with 
the UK, Australia and New Zealand. During the 1960s these three national governments 
were committed to ‘bridge building’ or a policy of ‘constructive engagement’; a change in 
outlook in Australia during the early 1970s and a temporary shift in New Zealand between 
1973 and 1975 weakened that consensus, but for most of the period of the organised 
boycott campaign, the governments of both the UK, especially during the Conservative 
Government of Margaret Thatcher, and New Zealand between 1975 and 1984 maintained a 
policy of engagement with the apartheid state. The demand for the sports boycott in all three 
countries, therefore, lay with civil society campaign groups such as Stop the ‘Seventy Tour 
and the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the UK and Halt All Racist Tours and the National Anti-
Apartheid Council (later, HART: NZAAM) in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Each of these 
organisations maintained close links with the network of non-racial sports bodies within 
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South Africa; in the case of HART: NZAAM there were also close working relationships with 
the South African liberation movements such as the ANC, PAC, BCM(A) and SWAPO.15 
 
The cultural politics of South Africa and the significance of rugby union in Afrikaner 
masculine cultures meant that, in terms of the sports boycott after 1970, the national 
governing bodies for rugby in the UK, Australia and New Zealand had a disproportionate 
influence. After the early 1970s when cricket ties were cut and the rugby unions in the UK 
and Australia suspended competition with South Africa the most important recalcitrant group 
breaching the sports boycott was the New Zealand Rugby Football Union. While other sports 
breached the boycott such as Masters athletics and other governing bodies held out such as 
the French rugby union in South Africa it was the NZRFU that mattered. This was seen, for 
instance, as early as 1970 when Maori and Pacific Islander members of the national rugby 
team, the All Blacks, were given ‘honorary White’ status for the duration of the team’s tour – 
although the South Africans asked that any Polynesians in the team not be ‘too dark’.16 
 
The global sports system 
The final factor contributing to the cultural impact of the sports boycott in South Africa was 
the global sports system that sustained international tours. Maintaining the focus on rugby 
union as the most important international sports contact to the régime of power in apartheid 
South Africa and, in terms of the sports boycott, the most recalcitrant, South Africa’s sporting 
isolation lasted at most only six years: South Africa was readmitted to full international 
competition in 1992. The last notable rugby tour, a ‘rebel’ tour of a close to full strength New 
Zealand national team, was in 1986 (the 1989 ‘international’ tour had only limited 
significance and included no New Zealanders, widely seen as South Africa’s predominant 
rival to global rugby supremacy). Cricket, the other sport of significance in White South 
Africa, maintained a programme of ‘rebel’ tours until the late 1980s.17 
 
Official tours were organised by the international federation, in rugby union’s case the 
International Rugby Board (IRB), following a tightly planned programme known several years 
in advance; the only way for a match to be an official international ‘test’ was if it was 
sanctioned by the IRB. Timing, scheduling, rules, officiating, locations, eligibility and anything 
else to do with touring programmes all had to be endorsed by the IRB and were rigorously 
policed by national governing bodies. Other than national level competition, such as in rugby 
union national provincial-level leagues during the amateur era, these international tours were 
the only opportunity most people had to see élite competition. The tours also tended to be of 
a long duration. For instance, the South African rugby tour of New Zealand in 1981 lasted 56 
days, plus travel time and two weeks of matches in the USA. Even the unofficial, ‘rebel’, New 
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Zealand tour of South Africa in 1986 lasted six weeks and included 11 matches. These 
events were rare, had a high profile and were of great cultural significance. 
 
The anti-apartheid sports boycott, focussing on South Africa, had six distinctive features that 
were more obvious where the campaign focussed on single sport settings than the multi-
sport context of the Olympic Games, but that are also distinctive in that the Olympic issue 
was resolved relatively early in the boycott era. The first feature was that sport mattered in 
that it was a major factor of White South African culture, but that some sports mattered more 
than others for reasons specific to the South African cultural order. The second distinctive 
feature is that the boycott call came from oppressed groups within South Africa. The third is 
that these oppressed groups and anti-apartheid allies within the country had, during the 
apartheid era, built credible internal alternatives to the apartheid-based sports governance 
system in the form of non-racial bodies. Fourth, the campaign gained strength during 1960s 
with decolonisation, the power of the Third World project and growing significance of Eastern 
bloc states. Fifth, during its first ten years the boycott campaign shifted emphasis from 
narrowly sport-focussed to anti-apartheid in general as the wider anti-apartheid movement 
and its related boycott campaigns matured. Finally, the campaign confronted an 
internationally regulated sports system where, for international purposes, the International 
Federation (IF) governed relations with many aspects of management delegated to National 
Governing Bodies.  
 
These six characteristics influence the analytical fit with how the wider literature on boycotts 
can help shape explanations of this cultural boycott. This literature is limited. For the most 
part discussion of boycotts focus on two things: economic boycotts and, to a lesser extent, 
third party boycotts such as industrial or political action in support of another group’s boycott 
activity. The national focus of these debates means that this discussion is limited by the 
characteristics of specific jurisdictions. The following discussion will therefore draw on the 
economics-based literature centred on international economic and relations questions to 
propose a theory of sports boycotts in the context of a wider set of cultural boycotts. The 
starting point is that boycotts are only ever tactical or at best strategic; they are never an end 
in themselves but always a means to an end. 
 
The Boycott as a tactic 
 
The international relations and economics literature tends to conflate sanctions, embargoes 
and boycotts. Debates about the use of sanctions as a policy tool often assume a simple and 
direct relationship between political power and economic strength, whereas it is often the 
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case that boycotts are imposed by the relatively powerless – as seen in the US Civil Rights 
Movement’s Alabama Bus Boycott in 1954. Even with the presumption of power, the 
consensus in the literature is that economic sanctions work by attrition, are ineffective as a 
singular policy response and are more likely to be effective when invoked as a part of a 
broader strategy including diplomatic and other non-economic pressure. 
 
Drawing on this literature produces an interpretation of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions 
shaped by a focus on formal state actions and measures of economic consequences. As a 
result, we can define sanctions as “actions initiated by one or more international actors (the 
‘senders’) against one or more others (the ‘targets’) with either of two purposes: to punish 
the targets by depriving them of some value and/or make the ‘targets’ comply with certain 
norms the senders deem important”.18 We need also to consider legal and political theory to 
distinguish between three seemingly synonymous terms. Although ‘sanction’ also acts as a 
generic term, for the purposes of the remainder of this discussion, sanctions are penalties 
attached to transgression and breach of international law. Embargoes are a prohibition by 
one country or a group of countries of certain kinds of economic or other relations as a 
reprisal action designed to coerce political policy shifts or to injure a target nation taking a 
certain political stand. Finally, the boycott is the cessation or curtailment of contact or 
relations with a target nation on account of political differences, so as to punish a nation for a 
political position adopted or to coerce it into abandoning it.19 Given these distinctions, the 
campaign to isolate South African sport during the apartheid era was enforcing a boycott of 
South African sport in response to a call for an embargo of apartheid. When it comes to the 
recent actions focussed on Israel, this distinction is important. 
 
The debate about sanctions faded after the early 1980s as scholars turned their attention to 
other issues of international economic relations and with the embedding of neo-classical 
dominance. By 1980 a consensus had been reached regarding sanctions, embargoes and 
boycotts. Scholarly debate of the issue since then has operated within the parameters of that 
consensus; there has been no significant reconceptualization of these models. The 
discussion embedded embargoes and boycotts within a general focus on sanctions. This is 
unreasonable in the case of sporting and other cultural boycotts. The use of sanctions as a 
policy tool relies on the assumption of a direct relationship between political power and 
economic strength. Although there is usually a simple reason for the invocation of sanctions 
there are always complex factors in any state’s decision to use them. These factors are often 
as much about relations with other third-party states as those with the target state. The 
crucial limitation in cultural policy on the applicability of this literature focussing on state 
actions in economic policy is that boycotts are often a tool of the relatively powerless. 
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 While noting this limitation, the economics literature suggests that it is possible to draw some 
common conclusions from the application of sports embargoes and boycotts and of 
economic sanctions. Sanctions, and by implication boycotts or embargoes, can achieve their 
intended outcome. This outcome is possible because sanctions can maintain the perception 
that damage has been inflicted, can express a sense of morality and justice, can signify 
disapproval and displeasure, can satisfy the emotional needs of the sanctioner to be seen to 
be acting, can help maintain the sanctioner’s positive image and reputation, can relieve 
domestic pressure on the sanctioner, especially if there is a broad popular movement, and 
can inflict symbolic vengeance on the target. Debates in the UK in 2011 and the USA 
intermittently since 2003 over the calls for an academic boycott of Israeli higher education 
institutions show just how intense and fraught the perceived impact of boycotts, embargoes 
and sanctions can be. Furthermore, if there is no short term solution or compromise there is 
on-going inconvenience, target states become examples, and the sanctioner’s self-image 
and self-confidence can be restored. 
 
The effectiveness of sports boycotts and embargoes relies on several distinctive features. 
The most important of these is product substitution. Just as the impact of economic 
sanctions needs to be seen in the light of access to other sources of or substitutes for goods 
being denied, consideration needs to be given to access to additional or alternative sports 
events.20 The organisation of international sport means that the product being denied could 
not be acquired from elsewhere, even if there are close alternatives. International sport is 
often described as a monopoly, that is, where a single ‘seller’ dominates the international 
sport ‘market’. For instance, the Commonwealth Games Association can be seen as 
providing a sports event similar to that provided by the IOC in that the Commonwealth 
Games and other similar events such as the Francophone or Pan-African Games emulate 
but do not seek to replace the Olympic Games. The Games of the New Emerging Forces 
(GANEFO) in Indonesia in 1963 was an international multi-sport festival event emulating the 
Olympic Games and largely funded by the People’s Republic of China as an alternative to 
the Olympics, where the IOC had recognised Taiwan (Republic of China) as its Chinese 
member; GANEFO may be seen as an attempt at product substitution.21 As in this case, 
very few attempts at product substitution have been successful although some, notably in 
cricket, rugby union and rugby league, have had significant effects. This dominance of 
Olympic-centred analysis means that international sport is often described as a monopoly, 
that is, where a single ‘seller’ dominates the international sport ‘market’. This approach 
overstates the agency of international sports organisations.  Monopsony exists where there 
are several sellers but only one purchaser – it is the inversion of monopoly where a single 
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seller has multiple purchasers, and markedly shifts the balance of market power and 
relations. 
 
While the argument that international sports governing bodies are monopolistic is correct in 
that they monopolise international sports provision, the full significance of analyses derived 
from international economics in relation to sports boycotts may only be seen if bodies such 
as the International Rugby Board and the International Olympic Committee are understood 
as cartels with either monopolistic or monopsonistic characteristics.22 Doing so requires a 
shift in emphasis in analysis of what can be seen as an international sports market away 
from a focus on the international body to focus on the national governing body (NGB). The 
tendency to focus on control by the international body belies an ideological dominance of 
Olympic studies where the IOC is, historically and currently, a top-down governance régime 
– the IOC predated National Olympic Committees. Seeing the IOC as a monopolistic cartel – 
that is, as a single seller – is correct, although the now defunct Friendship Games show that 
there are limits to that monopoly. This is not the case in most sports where international 
federations (IFs) – the IRB, FIFA, the IAAF, FINA and so forth – were at their moment of 
formation confederations of pre-existing national bodies meaning that they should be 
understood as monopsonistic cartels. 
 
Effective analysis of non-Olympic sports boycotts requires that sport specific IFs are 
understood as cartels with monopsonistic characteristics. In the case of international 
competition by nationally representative teams, these international sports bodies are the only 
purchaser, in part because they have devised and organised the ‘market’ in international 
sports competition. Devising and organising international sport is part of what these IFs, as 
confederations of pre-existing NGBs, were set up to do, along with determining agreed rules 
of play and organising national competition. Furthermore, they are monopsonistic cartels of 
monopsonistic bodies: their market control as the single purchaser exists at both 
international and national level. Their effectiveness as a monopsonistic cartel relies on their 
ability to prevent the development of viable substitutes, which is in part why the creation of 
‘rebel’ leagues in cricket in 1977, rugby union in 1995 and rugby league in 1996 had such a 
profound impact on the structure and organisation of each of those sports. 
 
For reasons of space, further discussion of a detailed analysis of boycotts, embargoes and 
sanctions must be deferred. Issues essential to this more detailed analysis includes the 
extent to which target states have access to close alternatives, for example the ‘rebel’ tours 
of South Africa, as well as other counter leverages such as an increasing cultural emphasis 
on the significance of national level competition, for instance the status accorded cricket’s 
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Currie Cup in apartheid era South Africa once the boycotts began to take effect. Further 
analysis is needed of the extent to which the boycott campaigns can be seen to be effective, 
which will require a longer term view than that often taken by critics of the approach who 
seem to expect immediate or short term results. The existing literature that points to the 
place of boycotts, sanctions and embargoes as part of a wider suite of policy instruments 
and as attritional is crucial here. 
 
There are several elements where common conclusions about economic and cultural 
boycotts do not exist. First, unlike economic sanctions, hinting at cultural and sporting 
boycotts is not more effective than imposing them. Second, there little evidence that the 
imposition of sporting and cultural boycotts imposes costs on sender states other than to the 
organising body.23 Third, other than in the case of some aspects of multi-lateral sports 
events, third parties seldom experience any costs or losses associated with sporting and 
cultural boycotts. Fourth, it is unlikely that sports-related sanctions will undermine the 
credibility of the sanctioner leading to them being seen as an unreliable supplier – in large 
part because international sport is monopsonistic – although the ‘unreliable supplier’ issue 
may limit action by individual NGBs, depending on the organisational reach of IFs. 
 
There are two general points where common ground exists. First, the sanctioner needs to be 
fully aware of the potential costs. In analyses of economic sanctions these are relatively 
straight forward and direct costs may be comparatively accurately calculated.24 In sporting 
and cultural boycotts there is a far greater number of factors to consider ranging from the 
domestic political response to the effect on the cultural standing of particular activities or 
sports. Second, the target’s responses may lead to new sources of supply being discovered, 
the stimulation of conservation to reduce demand, or development of substitutes – in the 
South African sports case, these responses include the ‘rebel’ tours and the strenuous 
efforts on the part of the South African government and key elements of its civil society to 
circumvent the boycott.25 
 
Additional common conclusions may be drawn about the effectiveness of sanctions, 
embargoes or boycotts applied by international or multinational bodies.26 These tend to carry 
more moral power than action taken by individual countries but contain the potential to 
weaken the international body by causing withdrawals or attacks by powerful target states. 
The nature of multinational and international sport means that it is important to consider the 
compatibility of sports’ structures with the objectives of the campaign. Conclusions derived 
from consideration of Olympic boycotts, particularly Moscow in 1980 and Los Angeles in 
1984, do not fit the isolation of South African sport. By dealing with individual sports and a 
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single national organising body as well as having a focus on governments through domestic 
political pressures, the campaign developed a form different from the Olympic boycotts. It 
could be presented as a response to a call from within South Africa and as directly linked to 
South Africa’s conditions. The same could not be said for the Olympic boycott campaigns 
organised by the USA and the USSR. However, the idealist sentiment asserting a supra-
political status of sport was still powerful and able to be utilised by governments in South 
Africa and elsewhere to oppose the anti-apartheid movements. This indicates that the issues 
on which to focus in considering the isolation of apartheid sport are the political structures of 
the protest movement as well as those of single sporting bodies and governments, the 
existence of a popular protest movement leading the call for a boycott, and the use of the 
apolitical sports argument and the anti-apartheid movement’s ability to counter that through 
the significance of rugby and cricket and the politicisation of South African sport. 
 
The basic lesson to be learned from the economic sanctions literature is that sanctions, 
embargoes and boycotts may not achieve all their intended goals, but can still have a 
profound impact. As Daoudi and Dajani argue, “they have the power to cut fresh inroads, 
impose heavy sacrifices on the target, and inflict deep internal cleavages in the political 
fabric of the target regime – cleavages hard for the untrained eye to see on initial impact”.27 
It is likely that only superpowers are able to bear the economic strain or impact of being a 
target in the short run, although there are many states which remain convinced of their 
‘rightness’ when faced with challenges to their resilience as cultural isolation grows with non-
economic sanctions. In the South African case there were changes in the boycott strategy 
following limited sporting integration in the late 1980s with the support of the ANC, which, in 
turn, held out the promise of return to international competition. Had the isolation of rugby 
union been more complete and in effect earlier there is little doubt that white South Africa 
would have lost a major aspect of its cultural strength. 
 
The economics and international relations literature helps us fill out some conceptual gaps in 
discussing the South African sports boycotts, and leads to a three part model proposing that 
sanctions, embargoes and boycotts: 
1) Are effective only as part of broader suite of isolating activities 
2) Operate in a market determined by monopsonistic cartels, so analyses of likely 
and actual effectiveness must address 
a. access to alternatives in sender states 
b. access to alternatives in target states 
3) Have an effect that tends to be cultural and to do with national psychological well-
being, and determined by the significance of the sport in question. 
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In addition, the anti-apartheid campaign suggests that sports boycotts gain legitimacy and 
therefore solidarity/support from: 
a. being in support of an indigenous call 
b. being able to point to alternative representative sports bodies 
 
Noting that the anti-apartheid campaign on which this model is based was played out in a 
global environment that, 20 years ago, was markedly different from the current one, the 
opposition to the UEFA Under-21 championships held in Israel in 2013, including a boycott 
call, provides an opportunity to revisit this analysis. Comparing one campaign – and so far 
the only time sport has been a significant factor in the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) 
campaign currently targeting Israel – with developments over a thirty year movement is not a 
good basis for meaningful evaluation, so this discussion is tentative, exploratory and 
cautious in its conclusions. 
 
Israel, the BDS campaign and soccer 
 
The 22 June 2011 appeal to UEFA by 42 Palestinian football clubs, a further 18 players and 
managers and 19 other leading Palestinian sport figures to reverse its decision to hold its 
2013 under-21 championship in Israel marked a shift in the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment 
and Sanctions (BDS) campaign. The call appears to be the first coordinated BDS attempt to 
address a multi-lateral sports event; the dispersed character of the BDS campaign means 
being any more definitive is unwise. The call for the tournament to be moved from Israel 
echoed the principal elements of the BDS campaign, charging Israel with practicing “a 
unique combination of occupation, colonization and apartheid against the indigenous 
Palestinian population”.28 Noting the definitions earlier, this should be seen as call for a 
sporting sanction to be imposed on Israel in response to a call for an embargo on the 
grounds that it is held to violate international law and Palestinian human rights in its 
“occupation, colonization and apartheid”.  
 
The 2011 letter highlights football-related evidence to support its charge of ‘occupation, 
colonization and apartheid’. The ‘occupation’ charge is sustained by reference to two factors; 
the destruction of large section of the Gaza Strip in 2008/09 during Operation Cast Lead 
including the destruction of the Rafah National Stadium, an action defended by Israel as 
targeting militants launching rockets, and the related deaths of footballers among the 1400 
dead in Gaza. The call also identifies the proximity of the Separation Wall, ruled illegal in 
2004 by the International Court of Justice, to the Faisal Al Hussein Stadium in Al-Ram and 
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the detention “without trial or … public explanation” of the Palestinian National Team 
member Mahmoud Kamel Al-Sarsak. 
 
The ‘colonization’ charge is sustained by the reference to the siting of Ramat Gan Stadium, 
designated host of some games, on land seized from the Palestinian villages of Jarisha and 
al-Jammasin al Sharqi under the Absentee Property Law, 5710-1950, labelled in the call as 
the Absentee Property Owners Law (1950). The law, at Art 1(b), defined as absentee, every 
Palestinian or resident in Palestine who left their usual place of residence in Palestine for 
any place inside or outside the country after the United Nations resolution agreeing to the 
partition of Palestine29; this means anyone, including those non-combatants fleeing conflict 
in 1948, who left their property for anywhere else inside or outside pre-partition Palestine 
was designated absentee and their property liable to seizure by the state. 
 
The ‘apartheid’ charge is the one that often jars with wider public opinion, given the close 
association of apartheid with the era of National Party rule in South Africa from 1948 to 
1994. As noted earlier, in 1973 the UN defined apartheid as “inhuman acts for the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial 
group and systematically oppressing them”; legal scholars and others continue to debate the 
application of this definition to Israeli domestic law. The call to UEFA, however, identifies the 
Israeli permit system, seen as parallel to the South African Pass Laws, as placing limitations 
on Palestinian freedom of movement that denies footballers access to tournaments and 
other matches and to the opportunity to practice.30 
 
The call to rescind the opportunity for Israel to host this tournament takes a form that links 
closely to the 2005 BDS call, and must be understood in that light. The BDS call is a right’s 
based call for action to build pressure on Israel “to respect fundamental human rights and to 
end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine”.31 The call, being rights based, 
does not envisage a specific political structure, but calls for action to address key issues for 
the three sections of Palestinian society – refugees, the occupied and Palestinian citizens of 
Israel. It therefore calls on its supporters to pressure Israel to recognise and act on its 
international obligations by: 
1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall; 
2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full 
equality; and 
3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to 
their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194. 
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The three aspects of sports’ call to UEFA, occupation, colonization and apartheid, parallel 
these three aspects of the 2005 declaration. 
 
A broad suite of isolating activities 
An accurate reading of the sports organisations’ letter to UEFA requires that it be placed in 
the BDS context. To do so means that there are two other key factors to consider; the first 
relates to the genesis of the BDS campaign; the second to the detail of the BDS call. The 
genesis of the call directs attention to the history of Israel and Palestine. For much of the 
20th century, the politics of the region have been presented as one of national liberation, 
both in the form of the Zionist project of settlement and state-building, and the Palestinian 
resistance to occupation by and expulsion from that state. A Palestinian politics of national 
liberation may be seen in the federation of organisations that became the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation. Changes in geo-political relations and in Palestinian society meant 
that during the last quarter of the 20th century there were significant changes in Palestinian 
politics, including heightened military control in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT, 
Gaza and the West Bank) and the emergence of new forms of civil society including social 
clubs, welfare and educational organisations. The era also reveals changes in political 
organisation, with a shift away from accommodation with the settler state through 
mechanisms such as the mukhtar (headman) system.32 
 
Increasing frustration at limited change for the better for Palestinians within the Green Line, 
marking Israel’s borders, and in the OPT saw an outburst of resistance in 1987, now known 
as the First Intifada.33 This Intifada saw active resistance to Israeli policy and practice from 
Palestinian citizens and those living under occupation in a way that Israel had not 
experienced before, and the consistent but not always successful efforts that the 
Palestinians made to avoid armed conflict unsettled Israeli police and the Israeli Defence 
Forces in a way that meant some of the Israeli responses seemed to be excessive, at 
significant public image costs. In an effort to control the Intifada, and after considerable 
international pressure, Israel and the PLO entered negotiations leading to the Oslo accords 
of 1993 and the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) with jurisdiction over a range of 
social, security and civil issues in the OPT. The notable omission from the PA was many of 
civil society institutions that had filled an important need on the ground during that earlier era 
of armed national liberation struggle. This exclusion as well as with the problematic role of 
the PA as an agent of development under conditions determined by the occupation and 
therefore as an agent of the occupation led to a widespread Palestinian view that the PA 
was a corrupt organisation. The result was shifts in the political balance of forces in 
Palestinian society opening space for more active civil society34; it was 171 organisations 
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comprising a major part of this civil society that issued the BDS call in 2005. This is the first 
significant difference from the South African case: the groups calling for BDS are not 
national liberation movements similar to those in South Africa but civil society institutions that 
are often critical of the ‘official’ national liberation groups, now dominated by those gathered 
around Fatah and around Hamas. 
 
The second key aspect of the BDS call that is relevant to this exploration of the 2013 UEFA 
U-21 championship is its target. Although the 2005 call, and much of the discussion since, 
invokes the South African precedent, the terms of the call are different. Whereas the call for 
the total isolation of South Africa meant that there should be no contact of any form other 
than with the liberation movements, the Palestinian call is for BDS aimed at the State of 
Israel, not the total isolation of Israelis; this is clear in the inclusion of the invitation to 
“conscientious Israelis to support this call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace”. The 
sports organisations’ call sits alongside efforts to organise other cultural boycotts, an 
academic boycott and economic boycotts of Israeli business as well as companies investing 
in and sustaining the occupation.35 The economic and cultural boycotts have been more 
successful than academic and sports boycotts. BDS advocates are clear, time and again, 
that the focus is the state of Israel, not individual Israelis. Hence, the 2011 call was 
consistent with the broader BDS campaign in calling on UEFA to withdraw the 
championships from Israel; the target was not Israeli players in European leagues. In this 
sense there is a fundamental difference with the South African-focussed campaign. 
 
This background to the U-21 championship campaign suggests that this case is consistent 
with the first element of the model. There has been a call for widespread BDS activity that 
has seen attempted and successful action in a range of economic sectors – transport, 
education, culture and others. The BDS campaign itself admits that it “had been slow to 
promote a sporting boycott”36 although there has been some BDS-related sport-focussed 
protest activity, such as during the 2009 Israel-Sweden Davis Cup match,37 sport-related 
BDS activity has been only a very small part of the campaign. This is likely to be a result of 
the ‘boycott Israel, not Israelis’ stance. There is a second strand related to the boycott call as 
part of a wider sphere of action linked to UEFA’s anti-racism work. UEFA, as is the case with 
most of its constituents, actively supports anti-racism campaigns ; these campaigns, 
although designed to focus on structural racism as well as more overt racist acts, tend to 
gain most attention when addressing overt racism. Based on this focus and alongside the 
campaign against holding the tournament in Israel, critics also drew attention to 
manifestations of overt racism in Israeli football. Much of the criticism centred on the 
Jerusalem-based club Beitar, officials of which have been criticised within Israel for what 
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seems to be reluctance to confront some of the more overt and ostentatious displays of anti-
Palestinian, anti-Arab and anti-Islamic views among the clubs supporters, highlighting in 
particular the actions of a fan group targeting two Chechen players signed by the team early 
in 2013 – its first Muslim players. Others have argued that this is a minority of fans, although 
minorities combined with club inaction has not stopped UEFA or national federation anti-
racism activity in other settings. This UEFA focussed anti-racism argument is best seen as in 
parallel to but not part of the principal boycott call. It has, however, seemed to have a profile 
that has overshadowed and distracted from the BDS aspects of the campaign. 
 
International football tournaments 
Considering international sport within a market determined by monopsonistic cartels means 
that analyses of the likely and actual effectiveness of boycotts must address both the access 
to sporting alternatives in sender states and the access to alternatives in target states. This 
requires a focus on access to and the status of élite youth football in both likely sender 
states and in Israel. It is on this point that the character of the international sports market as 
monopsonistic becomes important. UEFA, as the only ‘purchaser’, can determine both the 
character of exchange in the market and the participants in that market. This means that a 
unilateral decision by one or a minority of the participating national associations to boycott 
could have been extremely expensive in that they could have been seen as an unreliable 
supplier and possibly in violation of membership and competition rules. In this multi-lateral 
competitive context, the international federation is not only the single purchaser but also 
organises the market, including determining the rules of market entry and participation; 
under these conditions member associations are unlikely to act unilaterally. In this situation 
where national governing bodies have a single ‘purchaser’ for international competitive 
events a decision by UEFA as that ‘purchaser’ to withdraw the tournament from Israel would 
have no significant effect on the senders access to élite competitive sport; there would be no 
need to seek an alternative. 
 
The effect on Israel, had UEFA acted on the BDS call, could have been catastrophic, for the 
same reason that any other member association would be unlikely to act unilaterally. Israel 
would lose access to élite international youth football played at home. Furthermore, the 
control the international federations exercise over club football, such as the Champions 
League, would threaten access to all forms levels of élite football should a general football or 
sports boycott be successful. Given that the call was not for a comprehensive UEFA boycott 
but for the tournament to be hosted by another UEFA member, should UEFA have agreed 
the effect would have less severe but still significant. It is almost certain that Israel would not 
have participated in the tournament, and it would not have had access to an alternative form 
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of competition at home. Under these circumstances, and noting the specific characteristics 
of international football governance including the control of élite club play, a decision by 
UEFA to relocate the tournament is likely to have been a major blow to Israeli football, 
leaving aside the political and psychological consequences of the move. 
 
National psychological well-being 
The third element of the model, that the effect of any boycott tends to be cultural, related to 
national self-perception, confidence and well-being and determined by significance of the 
sport in question, in this case, is unanswerable; there was no boycott. That the tournament 
took place, however, is presented by representatives of the Israel Football Association (IFA) 
as a significant advance for and benefit to Israeli football. The tournament director, Ronen 
Hershco, presented it as a success in terms of legacy even though the Israeli team did not 
progress beyond the group stage.38 It Is reasonable to assume that had UEFA decided to 
shift the tournament the effect would have been significant, especially if there was no 
significant shift in the ‘security situation’, as the conflict is often euphemistically labelled. 
Given the counterfactual aspects of this proposition, it remains no more than an assumption 
although the combination of football’s cultural significance in Israel combined with Israel’s 
powerful desire to normalise its global position and role as seen in the government’s ‘Brand 
Israel’ programme suggests that the assumption may be well founded. 
 
Solidarity and legitimacy 
In addition to these three aspects of the model, success and international support for the 
boycott relies on the legitimacy of any boycott activity, which relates to matters ‘on the 
ground’ in the Israel-Palestine sporting and political nexus. The protest action targeting the 
UEFA competition is clearly in support of an indigenous call from the Palestinian sports 
community with the 22 June 2011 letter signed by 42 sports clubs and a further 37 
individuals. This is a marked change from the initial 2005 BDS call where there are no 
obvious sports clubs among the 171 civil society signatory groups. In the sports case there is 
legitimacy granted to the BDS activity in that it is in support of a call by Palestinian sports 
groups.  
 
The more difficult aspect of legitimacy concerns the presence of alternative representative 
sports bodies. It may be that this is distinctive to the South African setting and has less 
resonance in the case of Israel/Palestine. The question of sports federations in historic 
Palestine shows the presence of several groups claiming representative status. The 
Palestine Football Association, for instance, cited by FIFA as the predecessor of its member 
organisations for both Palestine and Israel was founded in 1928 and admitted to FIFA in 
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1929, yet the current information page for Palestine shows its membership of FIFA 
beginning in 1998.39 The PFA initially had Arab members, in 1929 11 of its 69 teams were 
Arab teams, but after the mid-1930s until its transformation into the Israel Football 
Association it became increasingly Zionist group with only minimal membership of 
mandatory Palestine’s Arab population. Parallel organisations emerged from the mid-1940s 
in the form of the Arab Palestine Sports Association, also known as General Palestinian 
Sports Association, and the Islamic Sports Club.40 Palestine was only admitted to FIFA in 
1998, 50 years after partition, in the wake of recognition of Palestine as a proto-state as part 
of the Oslo Accords and the emerging ‘two state solution’. The effect is that while Israel and 
Palestine exist as separate political entities, BDS campaigners are not able to point to 
alternative representative sports bodies in Israel because the Palestinians exist in three 
distinct formations – refugees in neighbouring states and, more widely dispersed, residents 
of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and citizens of Israel. In football terms, the latter are 
incorporated in the IFA while the PFA covers the OPT and some refugee camps. The 
distinction is based on the proto-state-like status of Palestine. Furthermore, while each 
remains identified as a distinct state/quasi-state the respective football associations are in 
different regional confederations – UEFA for Israel and the Asian Football Confederation for 
Palestine and the rest of region. The BDS call directed at UEFA was in the interests of 
groups that are not the concern of UEFA. The legitimacy of the campaign, therefore, relies 
on its status as an indigenous call for action. 
 
BDS summary 
Returning to the model: 
1) The first element is that sports boycotts are effective only as part of broader suite of 
boycott activities; the call on UEFA to withdraw the 2013 under-21 tournament from 
Israel is clearly part of a wider BDS campaign, and the first time the campaign had 
ventured into multi-lateral sport. In this sense, the call is consistent with the 
campaign’s references to the South African focussed campaign and different from 
other boycott calls, such as the recent LGBT rights based call to boycott the Sochi 
Olympics which while based in LGBT activist groups remained distinct from either 
broader sport-oriented or civil rights focussed activism centred on Russia; that is, 
there is not a wider Russia- or sport-centred boycott activities in which the campaign 
could gain traction. 
2) The monopsonistic cartel that controls football has more power than some other 
international governing bodies because of its influence over élite club play, including 
international club competition. This suggests that football’s national governing bodies 
would be unlikely to act unilaterally but had UEFA acted the impact on ‘sender’ states 
21 
 
would have been minimal in terms of access to alternatives while Israel would likely 
be excluded from access to any alternatives. There are two further factors to 
consider here, that also mark the campaign apart from its South African predecessor. 
The first is that changes in global geo-politics mean that individual state governments 
are unlikely to take action over a sports boycott. The second is that even in the case 
of sports boycott, the global sport media complex means that Israelis may lose 
access to live international sports events but not to televised or other mediated 
forms. 
3) It is likely that action by UEFA to relocate the tournament would have had effects that 
were primarily cultural and detrimental to Israel’s national self-image in part because 
of the significance of football but more so because of government efforts to normalise 
Israel’s international image. 
4) As with the South African campaigns, the 2013 campaign gained legitimacy among 
supporters from being in support of a call from within the Palestinian sport structure; 
that is, an indigenous call. Unlike the South African case campaigners are not able to 
point to alternative representative sports bodies, in part because of distinction 
between Israel and Palestine as states and proto-states. 
 
The initial model is an argument based on a boycott tactic; in this case it can also be seen to 
be substantially appropriate in the case of an embargo – but more work and case study 
analysis is necessary to refine the elements related to the legitimacy question and the role of 
sport-specific international federations.  
 
A significant challenge to the BDS campaign, when developing its sport aspect, lies in the 
organisation of sport in Israel and Palestine. Football presents the issues well. Noting the 
existence of the Islamic League in Israel, mainstream Israeli football is not explicitly or 
uniquely divided along ethno-nationalist lines, unlike much of the rest of Israeli society and 
politics. There is a compelling analysis by Tamir Sorek, that football is, in his words, an 
“integrative enclave” which he notes is a combined product of the “interests of the Hebrew 
sports media and state institutions… and the Arab soccer fans, players and bureaucrats” 
while also limiting its integrative power because it acts as a site for “the majority’s interest in 
maintaining the status quo, and the need of a discriminated-against national minority to 
maintain active protest while at the same time preserving proper relations with the majority 
society”.41
 As with nearly every other site of social interaction in Israel/Palestine, football is 
layered, complex and wrapped in contested and disputed historical narratives and on the 
ground political power imbalances. This integrative element means that whereas, in many 
other respects, Israel might meet the UN’s definition of an apartheid state42 in the case of 
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football at least that is a more difficult case to make. This weakness may be seen in the way 
some campaign supporters have had to rely on the liberal framing of football’s official bodies’ 
anti-racism campaigns that tend to focus on individual and overt racist acts rather than 
structural or contextual racism. Development of a sport-focussed strand in the BDS 
campaign therefore suffers from a weak sport-specific analysis in dealing with Palestinian 
citizens of Israel: the situation is different for the occupation mainly because of its illegal 
aspects. The 22 June 2011 call by the 42 clubs pointed to the three aspects of colonisation, 
occupation and apartheid highlighted in the BDS campaign, but in the absence of sport-
specific issues, a sport-focussed campaign may find it difficult to gain traction. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper explores the politics of international sports relations by proposing a model for 
understanding sports boycotts based in global sport structures. This model is related to 
analyses of economic boycotts but is also based in an analysis of the way the structure of 
international sports governance creates and shapes the market in international competitive 
sport. The call by 42 Palestinian sports clubs for UEFA to relocate its 2013 under-21 
tournament from Israel made in line with the wider Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
campaign targeting Israel allows exploration of the organisation and politics of sports 
boycotts, as a specific form of cultural boycott, in a new geo-political context. The analysis 
poses further questions concerning the extent to which the distinctive features of sports 
organisation and governance in Israel/Palestine influence the extent to which a sports 
boycott can be a meaningful tool in the BDS tactical repertoire. Football’s role as an 
integrative enclave in Israel and the separate existence of internationally recognised 
Palestinian sports bodies suggests that previous tactical approaches to colonial and post-
colonising analyses will be of limited use. Second, the embedding of neo-liberal ideologies 
and the dominant role of market means of organisation means that international and national 
governing bodies exercise much of their control in less direct means than a generation ago. 
Third, the changing shape of global geo-politics, the decline of a bipolar world and growing 
influence of corporate institutions in international relations lessens the likely role of national 
governments in any wider sports or cultural boycott movement; as a result, analysis will need 
to focus on non-state and civil society institutions as factors in global sport politics. 
 
The major mistake any analysis could make would be to take the BDS campaign’s 
statements that it is inspired by the South African anti-apartheid boycott to mean that it is the 
same as that boycott; this new campaign is focussed on relations with the state of Israel, not 
with Israelis – this means analysts and activists need to grasp the analytical distinctions 
between playing rugby against South Africa and playing soccer in Israel. 
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